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of the Utah Supreme Court
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JAMES A. MCINTOSH
MCINTOSH & ROBERTSON
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant
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PETITION FOR RE-HEARING
POINT 1. THE MAJORITY OPINION'S STATEMENT THAT THE
PLAINTIFF "TRANSFERRED HIS ENTIRE INTEREST
IN THE DEMISED PREMISES TO RYAN FOR THE UNEXPIRED BALANCE OF THE TERM," IS ERRONEOUS
AND IN FACT IS CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE
CONCLUSION
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POINT 1
THE MAJORITY OPINIONfS STATEMENT THAT THE PLAINTIFF
"TRANSFERRED HIS ENTIRE INTEREST IN THE DEMISED PREMISES TO
RYAN FOR THE UNEXPIRED BALANCE OF THE TERM." IS ERRONEOUS
AND IN FACT IS CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE•

1.

Since this appeal involves a granting of a Motion

for Summary Judgment, the Supreme Court is obliged to interpret the evidence in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.
The cases hold that a party against whom a Motion for Summary
Judgment is made is entitled to have the reviewing Court interpret the evidence in a light most favorable to the said party.
Morris v. Farnsworth Motel, 123 U. 289, 59 P. 2d 297, 298 (1953);
Whitman v. W. T. Grant Co., 16 U. 2d 81, 395 P. 2d 918 (1964).
2.

The plaintiff's own testimony clearly shows that

he did not transfer his "entire interest" in the demised premises to Ryan. The official transcript of testimony of the
trial shows:
(1)

Plaintiff had $5,000 worth of his own

recreational amusement machines on the
premises at all times after the sale of the
"bar equipment" to Ryan [R. 141, 252]. He
was earning a profit of $5,000 annually
from these machines both before and after
the sale.

[R. 141]

These amusement items
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were in addition to the "bar equipment"
he sold to Ryan.

[R. 141, 144-146, 252]

The seventh paragraph of the majority opinion
assumes that the plaintiff's only interest
in the items on the demised premises was a
"security" interest in the bar equipment
which the plaintiff sold to Ryan.

The Court

concludes that this security interest did
not constitute a partial possession of the
premises.

However, plaintiff testified that

he owned amusement items worth $5,000 and comprised of cigarette machines, pinball machines,
juke boxes, etc.; that these items were also
on the premises and that these items constituted
a partial possession of the premises. The
Court's decision ignores these other items.
(2)

The plaintiff did not testify as stated

in the majority opinion that he "transferred
his entire interest in the demised premises
to Ryan for the unexpired balance of the term."
On the contrary, the plaintiff testified he
did not assign his leasehold interest to
Ryan for the following reasons:
(a)

The real property lease documents
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gave the plaintiff the first option to purchase the premises which he considered a
valuable property right* [R. 193- 194; Ex.
6-P, 118]

(b)

The sale of the business

was tentative only and it would not be
formalized in writing for two to six months
and until Marvin Ryan could get in a
sound financial position; therefore, the
plaintiff wanted to wait and see how
Ryan did.

If he did poorly, and the plain-

tiff had to take back the business, he did
not want to have to renegotiate his business
on the real property lease with the owners
of the building.

(c)

The

[R. 178, 181]

plaintiff had his own

recreational and amusement items worth
$5,000 on part of the leased premises which
satisfied paragraph seventeen (17) of the
real property lease for a holdover status
of the leased premises "or any part thereof."
[R. 141, 144-146, 252] .

(d)

The plaintiff retained title to
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all of the other property on the premises
which he was selling to Marvin Ryan.
177]

[R.

The evidence of trial clearly shows

that Marvin Ryan abandoned the premises
approximately twelve (12) days before the
locks were changed by the new owners of the
building.

During this twelve day period,

the only person owning the property both
bar equipment and amusement items would
be the plaintiff herein.
Ryan had

This is so because

defaulted on the purchase of the

"bar equipment" when he abandoned the premises and because he had not made the
monthly payments prior to that time.

At the trial, the question was asked of the plaintiff:

"Did

you ever assign the interest that you had in the lease, insofar as the use and occupancy of the premises was concerned,
to Mr. Ryan or anyone else?"
[R. 181, lines 6-9]
tion:

The plaintiffs answer was: "No.1

The plaintiff was further asked the ques-

"Why is it you didn't assign the lease-interest to him

[Ryan]?"

The plaintiff stated the reason he did not assign

the lease interest to Ryan was because the plaintiff had his
amusement machines and recreational equipment on the premises
and was therefore occupying and using part of the premises.
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He further stated, that

in the event Ryan did not realize

any profit from the purchase of the bar equipment during
the first few months, and the plaintiff had to repossess
the bar equipment, then there would be fewer legal problems
for the plaintiff in taking over the operation and business
and continuing it; if he retained his interest in the lease.
[R. 181, lines 18-29]
On cross-examination by Mr, Barber, the plaintiff
reaffirms the fact that he had not transferred his interest
in the premises to Mr. Ryan.

Mr. Barber asked the question:

"It is a matter of fact, isn't it, that after February 1,
1973, as a business man you had nothing to do with the
premises located at 368 South Main, Park City?"
question, the plaintiff answered:
fact."

"No, sir.

To this

That is not a

[R. 233] The plaintiff then went on to te]J. Mr.

Barber what interest he had in the premises.
The plaintiff further stated that after the sale to
Ryan, he was on the premises two to three times a week for
the purpose of servicing his own amusement items as well as
to insure that the "bar equipment" which he sold to Ryan was
not being depleted or wasted.

[R. 182]

Finally, Mr. Wangsgard stated that when Mrs. Fitzpatrick contacted him on behalf of the new owners and told
him that he would have to get his equipment out of the premises; and when the plaintiff asked her why she was contacting
him, she stated that she recognized that he was the tenant of
record on the lease and he was the person who the new owners
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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would have to deal with.
[ROCR,
194,
# 192,

The plaintiff submits that the majority opinion cannot
point to any line or page in the official record or transcript
of the trial proceedings which states either directly or
indirectly that the plaintiff transferred his interest in the
lease to Ryan the purchaser.
to that affect.

None of the witnesses testified

However, notwithstanding this overwhelming

evidence to the contrary, the majority opinion says: "Here
plaintiff transferred his entire interest in the demised
premises to Ryan, for the unexpired balance of his term;" and
therefore plaintiff was not a sublessee.

The opinion also

says in the fifth (5th) paragraph in part as follows:

"This

plaintiff could not do, for he had transferred whatever possessory interest he had to Ryan, at the time of plaintiff's
sale to Ryan.

At the time of the sale, plaintiff had only a

month-to-month tenancy and this condition committed to Ryan,
retaining only a right of re-entry for commission broken."
The plaintiff submits this language is a mere gratuity not
supported by one shred of evidence in the official transcript.
Since the majority opinion is based on the false premise
about plaintiff having transferred his entire interest in the
demised premises to Ryan, the opinion should be amended to
set forth the correct facts; and, based on these correct
facts, to reach a different result in favor of the plaintiff
herein.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the plaintiff respectfully submits that he is entitled to a re-hearing on the
issues presented in his original brief; and the plaintiff
respectfully requests the opportunity to have an oral argument
pertaining to these issues,

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED
v

MCINTOSH & ROBERTSON

t?M^ a

M

-

IES A. MCINTOSH

torneys for Appellant
525 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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CERTIFICATE

I certify that I delivered two copies of the Petition
for Re-Hearing to James N. Barber, 455 South 300 East, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84111, this 24th day of November, 1975.

MCINTOSH & ROBERTSON

&n*rf-M
S A. MCINTOSH

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

